This article discusses the post-clientelist initiatives used by political parties in the selection of candidates within the party to determine the regent and vice regents nominated for the local election. Candidate selection is the political domain of political parties, but in the context of figure-based politics, parties tend to play more as political vehicle in the candidacy of local head. Through this role, resource exchanges take place between parties and candidates within the internal party candidacy arena. Using qualitative methods through in-depth interviews and observations of candidate selection in the Bekasi Regent 2017 election, this article seeks to reveal how post-clientelist initiatives are used by party elites to optimize the incumbency advantage as main political resource in the candidate selection to determine who will pair the incumbent. The results show that the dominance of party elites in candidate selection process determines how financial resources and political support are optimized to win the incumbent. Decision to choose the vice-regent from the same party while still forming coalitions with other parties indicates that post-clientelistic strategy is operated both internally and externally. This practice confirms the tendency of the candidate selection model to be more inclusive because it involves other parties, but remains pragmatic.
INTRODUCTION
This article is about the post-losing of a governor/vice governor clientelistic initiatives used by political parties in the selection of candidates within the party to determine the regent and vice regents nominated for the local election. The selection of candidates is in most cases a nonpublic and largely unknown political process. Nonetheless, it is one of the most relevant elements affecting the quality of democracies since criteria and procedures to select candidates lead to electoral lists from which citizens select their representatives (Cordero, Jaime-Castillo & Coller, 2016) . The phase of candidacy is chosen as the focus in this article because of the strategic role of this phase. Cordero, et.al. (2016) reveal that what is behind every selection process in multilevel democracies is the tension between regional or local political leadership and the central headquarters of parties. How this tension is managed and solved is a matter of political strategy in managing power relations.
The study on local election generally focuses on the phase of campaign which obviously shows how candidates compete against each other to get the vote (Hill, 2009; Lindsay, 2009) . In those studies, local election becomes the arena for actors, both candidates and political parties, to build their self-images as popular as possible among the public.
The other studies focus on the figure of candidates competing in local election, which resulted in research on the incumbency (Gordon, S. C. & Landa, 2009; Iskandar, 2015; Lestari, 2011; Stone, 2011; Sulistiyanto, 2009) . Those studies reveal the incumbents" strategy to win local election, while some studies also reveal why the incumbents lose in the next period of local election, though they have advantages such as access to bureaucracy, experience, and popularity among public. Meanwhile, studies focusing on the dimension of power structure reveal varieties of power relations which mark the practice of politics at some levels of election, including elections for local leaders, such as patronage and clientelism (Aspinall, 2014) , politics of dynasty (Agustino & Yusoff, 2010) , informal network (Paskarina, 2016; Sulistiyanto, 2009 ), oligarchy and cartel of political parties (Ambardi, 2009; Mietzner, 2013) . as the unit of analysis because it is the function of political parties (Daalder, 1992; Pennings & Hazan, 2001; Poguntke, et.al., 2016) . Nevertheless, the dynamics of politics in Indonesia show a different phenomenon. While the capacity of political parties is decreasing, the emergence of potential figures as candidates is more frequently promoted by institutions other than political parties.
Moreover, the opportunity given to independent candidates to join competition in elections for local head has made figure-based politics and support from volunteers play a bigger role in promoting the candidates.
Politicians also have to attract voters from wider sections of the population, including through populist measures.
Thus, figure-based politics is not just increase popular participation, but also creating new strategies to obtain public support. Therefore the competition is expanding in variety of strategies to distribute resources or at least complement distribution of patronage by way of "post-clientelist" initiatives (Manor, 2013) . This change has come about as patronage distribution has become costly and insufficient for maintaining popularity and political legitimacy.
Earlier studies have shown that many contemporary clientelistic linkages assume the existence of exchanges between patrons (parties) and clients (voters) with the help of brokers (party organizations) (Gallego, 2015; GansMorse, Mazzuca, & Nichter, 2014; Gherghina & Volintiru, 2017; Kitschelt, 2000; Muno, 2014; Rofieq & Nuryono, 2016 (Manor, 2013) .
Post-clientelist initiatives entail efforts to execute development projects, and to deliver goods and services, in ways that conform to authoritative norms, so that they are implemented in an impersonal manner through disciplined and relatively impartial bureaucratic channels according to policy criteria, rules and sometimes laws established by political leaders (Manor, 2013 (Poguntke, et.al., 2016 However, the political process which actually occurs in the mechanism has not yet been clearly revealed (Hazan & Rahat, 2010 The map of distribution of political power (Table 1) This practice confirms the tendency of the candidate selection model to be more inclusive because it involves other parties, but remains pragmatic.
